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American Prisoners in Foreign Prisons:
The Prisoner Transfer Treaties
I. Introduction
For the average American traveler, being apprehended and ar-
rested in a foreign country on criminal charges can be an unimagin-
able and bizarre experience. Whether he is in England,' which has a
legal system relatively similar to ours, or in China,2 which has a very
different legal system, he is likely to be equally mistaken in believing
that his status as an American citizen will be of any real assistance.
Unfortunately, unless he happens to be with United States military
forces, 3 or protected by some form of diplomatic or other immunity,
his criminal case will proceed from start to finish entirely within the
framework of the foreign legal system.4
In 1977, the United States took a significant step toward recog-
nizing the practical impact this principle of territorial jurisdiction
has had upon American citizens incarcerated in foreign prisons.
Prompted by numerous accounts of torture and substandard prison
conditions, the United States negotiated a prisoner transfer treaty
with Mexico.5
1. C. RHYNE, LAW AND JUDICIAL SYSTEMS OF NATIONS 791 (3d ed. 1978).
2. Id. at 129. As of 1974 there were no defense attorneys in China. Although there
was some statutory law, the legal system until very recently has been based on "self-criticism"
and Maoist values. There were no written criminal or civil codes. Id. at 130.
3. See, e.g., Agreement Regarding Status of United States Armed Forces in Republic
of Korea, July 9, 1966, United States-Korea, 17 U.S.T. 1677, T.I.A.S. No. 6127.
4. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, "apart from those persons subject to the
Status of Forces and comparable agreements and certain other restricted classes of Americans,
a foreign nation has plenary criminal jurisdiction . . . over all Americans-tourists, residents,
businessmen, government employees . . . who commit offenses against its laws within its terri-
tory." Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 15 n.29 (1957).
5. President Carter's Proclamation provided as follows:
The Treaty between the United States of America and the United Mexican
States on the Execution of Penal Sentences was signed at Mexico City on No-
vember 25, 1976, the text of which Treaty, in the English and Spanish lan-
guages, is hereto annexed;
The Senate of the United States of America by its resolution of July 21,
1977, two thirds of the Senators present concurring therein, gave its advice and
consent to ratification of the Treaty;
The Treaty was ratified by the President of the United States of America
on August 2, 1977, in pursuance of the advice and consent of the Senate, and
was duly ratified on the part of the United Mexican States;
It is provided in Article X of the Treaty that the Treaty shall enter into
force thirty days after the exchange of instruments of ratification;
The instruments of ratification of the Treaty were exchanged at Washing-
ton on October 31, 1977; and accordingly the Treaty will enter into force on
November 30, 1977.
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The legislative history behind the statutes enacted by Congress
to implement the Mexican treaty indicates that members of the Sen-
ate and the House were both relieved and optimistic at the adoption
of such a solution. 6 Records of congressional debates and speeches
reflect an almost unanimous endorsement of the prisoner transfer
treaty as the long-needed answer to the difficult problems facing
American citizens confined in foreign jails. As one Representative
stated in his speech on the floor of the House, the concept of the
prisoner transfer treaty was:
[a] novel7 and creative approach to resolving many of the
problems that have confronted Americans arrested, tried, con-
victed, and imprisoned abroad especially in Mexico. [He contin-
ued by commending the Departments of State and Justice] for
the energy and imagination . . . devoted to overcoming the con-
stitutional and legal questions . . . so that many of our citizens
• . . can return to the United States before the holidays.8
Approximately seven years have passed since the first prisoner trans-
fer treaty entered into force. This Comment presents an overview of
the prisoner transfer treaty system in both the general context of
international law, and in the more specific context of its interpene-
tration into American law.
II. Criminal Jurisdiction in International Law
A. In General
Under traditional rules of international law, each state has the
exclusive right to try, convict, sentence, and incarcerate any nonna-
tionals for criminal offenses committed within its borders. Interna-
tional conventions,9 custom,10 general principles of law recognized by
Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Nov. 25, 1976, United States-Mexico, proclama-
tion, 28 U.S.T. 7399, T.I.A.S. No. 8718 (entered into force Nov. 30, 1977) [hereinafter cited
as U.S.-Mexico Treaty].
6. President Carter endorsed the signing of implementing legislation as follows:
I think this is a major step forward. It indicates a compatibility between our
own country and our neighbors. It shows that we have a respect for their judicial
system, the fairness of their courts, and the trial processes. . . . I think it's al-
ways easier for someone who is in prison in their own land to have closer connec-
tion with their peer groups . . . so that they can work harder toward a rehabili-
tation effort.
BILLS CONCERNING INDOCHINA REFUGEES AND PRISONER TRANSFERS WITH MEXICO AND CA-
NADA, 13 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DoC., 1672-73 (Oct. 28, 1977).
7. A previous Council of Europe Treaty provided for transfer of prisoners among vari-
ous member nations. This treaty differed significantly from the American treaties in that it did
not provide for consent by the prisoner to his transfei. T. SIMON & R. PISANI, PRISONER
TRANSFER TREATIES IN THE AMERICAS: AN OVERVIEW (Nov. 9, 1982) (unpublished manu-
script) (footnote not in original).
8. 123 CONG. REC. H. 35,019 (1977) (statement of Rep. Fascell) (footnote not in
original).
9. See, e.g., Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Rela-
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civilized nations,"1 expert writers in the field of international law,12
and American judicial decisions13 all tend to support this concept. As
one commentator has noted:
When an American citizen commits a crime in a foreign country
he cannot complain if required to submit to such modes of trial
and to such punishment as the laws of that country may pre-
scribe for its own people, unless a different mode be provided for
by treaty stipulations between that country and the United
States. '
Territorial jurisdiction is so pervasive a principle that in some in-
stances it has been used to extend jurisdiction over a nonnational
despite the absence of physical entry into the territory.' 5 For exam-
ple, a foreign-based conspirator may be deemed to have entered one
state for purposes of jurisdiction if the conspiratory act alone has
occurred within the state.
B. An Exception-The Military Traveler
One type of treaty that creates a very different legal environ-
ment for the individual arrested in a foreign country arose under the
aegis of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).'" These
treaties, entitled Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA),' 7 were
designed to anticipate a certain, inevitable degree of social interac-
tion between foreign military forces and the domestic peacetime
tions and Cooperation Among States, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28), U.N.
Doc. A/8028 (1970) (discussion of the principle concerning the duty of a state not to intervene
within another state's domestic jurisdiction and the principle of the soverign equality of states).
10. See, e.g., U.S.-Mexico Treaty, supra note 5 (custom as evidenced by treaty); see
also Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Mar. 2, 1977, United States-Canada, 30
U.S.T. 6263, T.I.A.S. No. 9552; Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Feb. 10, 1978,
United States-Bolivia, 30 U.S.T. 796, T.I.A.S. No. 9219 (custom as evidenced by a series of
similar treaties).
11. Nine states and the Council of Europe have evidenced this general principle by
signing prisoner transfer treaties. See infra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 522 (3d ed.
1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 17
(1965).
13. See, e.g., Neely v. Henkle, 180 U.S. 109 (1901) (U.S. citizen extradited to Cuba,
where crime was committed, asserted unsuccessfully that United States Constitution should
apply to criminal proceedings there).
14. Id. at 123.
15. See I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 300-01 (3d ed.
1979). A state has jurisdiction over an individual when any essential element of his crime
occurs within the state. This principle is known as the objective territorial principle. One legal
scholar has noted "[Tihe classical illustration is the firing of a gun across a frontier causing a
homicide on the territory of the forum .... " Id.
16. North Atlantic Treaty Between United States of American and other Govern-
ments, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 221, T.I.A.S. No. 1964, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into force
Aug. 24, 1949).
17. Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status
of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, art. VII, 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846, 199 U.N.T.S. 67
[hereinafter cited as SOFA].
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communities within which they were to be deployed. To provide ade-
quate safeguards for the visiting as well as the host countries,
NATO-SOFAs contain both jurisdictional and procedural provisions
for criminal acts perpetrated in the foreign country by members of
the specific peacekeeping military forces."8 The United States has
subsequently signed similar reciprocal agreements with certain non-
NATO countries in which its peacekeeping forces are stationed.19
Under SOFA, the country whose troops are stationed on foreign
soil is termed the "sending state" while the country acting as host is
the "receiving state." For all criminal offenses, jurisdiction is defined
as either exclusive or concurrent. For instance, each country typi-
cally has exclusive jurisdiction over any acts which represent viola-
tions of its own criminal or military code but which would not violate
the criminal or military code of the other country, while concurrent
jurisdiction exists for most other crimes.20
Further, with concurrent jurisdiction, certain types of offenses
grant primary jurisdiction to either the sending or the receiving
state. Thus, under SOFA, the United States and other NATO mem-
bers have formally agreed to depart from certain principles of inter-
national criminal law." The second aspect of SOFA grants proce-
dural safeguards to the members of the sending country who are
subject to a foreign judicial system. Thus, NATO member countries
have agreed to grant visiting troops certain procedural safeguards
characteristic of the American Bill of Rights.2
Unfortunately, however, the average nonmilitary American
traveler cannot invoke the provisions of SOFA. He is confined to
only those legal processes which are customary to the country of ar-
rest.23 Therefore, although an American citizen may carry his pass-
18. INTERNATIONAL LAW DESKBOOK, JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, UNITED
STATES ARMY (1978).
19. See, e.g., Agreement Regarding Status of United States Armed Forces in Republic
of Korea, July 9, i966, United States-Korea, 17 U.S.T. 1677, T.I.A.S. No. 6127.
20. See SOFA, supra note 17.
21. Id.
22. SOFA guarantees members of the U.S. military who commit crimes while sta-
tioned in a member nation the right:
(a) to a prompt and speedy trial;(b) to be informed, in advance of trial, of the
specific charge or charges made against him; (c) to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him;(d) to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favour . . .;(e) to have legal representation of his own choice . . .;(f) . . . to
have the services of a competent interpreter; and(g) to communicate with a rep-
resentative of the Government of the sending State, when the rules of the court
permit, to have such a representative present at his trial.
SOFA, supra note 17, at art. VII, § (9); see Gordon, Individual Status and Individual Rights
under the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and the Supplementary Agreement with Ger-
many, 100 MIL. L. REV. 49 (1983) (viewing SOFA within the traditional framework of inter-
national territorial jurisdiction).




port with him at all times, the procedural safeguards which are im-
plicit in the United States Constitution do not travel with him but
remain at home.
C. The Need for a Similar Exception-The Nonmilitary Traveler
As increasing numbers of American tourists began to be ar-
rested in foreign countries on drug related charges in the 1970's, sto-
ries of torture and substandard criminal process found their way to
the American public. Billy Hayes published Midnight Express,
which depicted graphically the torture, deprivation, and corruption
encountered by a young college student imprisoned in Turkey on a
narcotics charge.24 A group of parents staged a sit-in at the White
House to protest the continued incarceration of their children in Bo-
livian jails.2 5 A young woman from Pennsylvania, following her re-
lease from a Bolivian prison, held a press conference in Washington
to describe the "horror movie" conditions to which she had been sub-
jected.26 In addition, various politicians, most notably Congressman
Fortney H. Stark of California, began to take an active personal in-
terest in the circumstances of American citizens incarcerated in for-
eign jails.
27
As the United States Government sustained increasing demands
to alleviate the various injustices confronting Americans arrested
abroad, a perplexing legal question began to emerge. This question
centered on concepts of independent governmental sovereignty and
the inherent right of a nation to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
offenses committed within the bounds of its territorial limits.28
Under traditional principles of international law, if a foreign of-
fender is nonmilitary, he is subject to the criminal laws and proce-
dures of the arresting country. The legal solution to this question
eventually emerged in the form of the prisoner transfer treaty. Be-
ginning in 1977, the United States signed and ratified one of these
treaties with each of the following countries: Mexico,29 Canada, 3
Bolivia, 1 Panama,32 Peru,33 and Turkey.34 Subsequently, similar
24. Hayes was unfortunate in that his imprisonment occurred before the 1981 prisoner
transfer treaty with Turkey. He was fortunate in that his second attempt at escape was suc-
cessful. B. HAYES, MIDNIGHT EXPRESS (1977).
25. Parents of thirty-three American citizens staged a sit-in in early May of 1977.
N.Y. Times, May 16, 1977, at 16, col. 6.
26. Michelle Fryer, from Pennsylvania, was twenty-one years old at the time of her
release. She gave the following description of the conditions in the prison: "Our dormitories
are overcrowded, with chipping paint, mice, bugs and exposed wires." Id.
27. 123 CONG. REC. 35,013 (1977) (statement of Rep. Stark).
28. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
29. U.S.-Mexico Treaty, supra note 5.
30. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Mar. 2, 1977, United States-Canada,
30 U.S.T. 6263, T.I.A.S. No. 9552 (entered into force July 19, 1978).
31. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Feb. 10, 1978, United States-Bolivia,
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treaties have been signed but not ratified with France,35 Thailand, 36
and the Council of Europe.
37
III. The Prisoner Transfer Treaty
A. In General
Careful drafting of the prisoner transfer treaties has preserved
for each country the traditional right to territorial jurisdiction over
all crimes committed within its borders. At the same time, however,
the treaties grant to the nonnational prisoner an opportunity to be
released to return home to complete his sentence. Under the terms of
the prisoner transfer treaties, the home country of the offender does
not become involved in either the adjudication or the sentencing of
its national.3 8 The provisions of the treaties do not become effective
until after completion of all foreign judicial processes and final sen-
tencing. Thus, the purpose of the treaty is:
to relieve the special hardships which fall upon prisoners incar-
cerated far from home and to make their rehabilitation more
feasible and also to relieve diplomatic and law enforcement rela-
tions between . . . two countries of the strains that arise from
the imprisonment of a substantial number of each country's na-
tionals in the institution of the other.3 9
In exchange for agreeing to maintain a position of noninvolvement,
the United States acquires an opportunity for its citizens to return to
America to fulfill the obligations of a foreign criminal sentence. 0
30 U.S.T. 796, T.I.A.S. No. 9219 (entered into force Aug. 17, 1978).
32. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Jan. 11, 1979, United States-Panama,
__ U.S.T. ., T.I.A.S. No. 9787 (entered into force June 17, 1980).
33. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, July 6, 1979, United States-Peru,
__ U.S.T. ., T.I.A.S. No. 9784 (entered into force July 21, 1980).
34. Treaty on the Enforcement of Penal Judgments, July 7, 1979, United States-Tur-
key, - U.S.T. ., T.I.A.S. No. 9892 (entered into force June 1, 1981).
35. Signed Jan. 25, 1983. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1983, at 5, col. 5.
36. Signed Oct. 29, 1982. Telephone interview with Michael Abbell, Esq., Assoc. Dir.,
Office Int'l Affairs, Dep't Justice (Nov. 22, 1983).
37. Signed Mar. 21, 1983. N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1983, at 5, col. 2. Fourteen European
countries have signed: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, Greece, Lichten-
stein, Portugal, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom. In
addition, the United States and Canada have signed by invitation as special signatories for
having participated as advisors with special knowledge on prisoner transfer treaties. Telephone
interview with Michael Abbell, Esq., Assoc. Dir., Office Int'l Affairs, Dep't Justice (Nov. 22,
1983).
38. Article VI of the U.S.-Mexico Treaty provides that the United States will not only
give up jurisdiction over the initial adjudicatory process, but also that Mexico "shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over any proceedings, regardless of their form, intended to challenge,
modify or set aside sentences handed down by its courts." U.S.-Mexico Treaty, supra note 5,
at art. VI.
39. C. VANCE, LETTER OF SUBMITTAL, H.R. REP. No. 720, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7
(1977).
40. Article V of the U.S.-Mexico Treaty provides that "the completion of a transferred
offender's sentence shall be carried out according to the laws and procedures of the Receiving
PRISONER TRANSFER TREATIES
Simultaneously, the agreement relieves the sentencing country of the
burden of providing prison services.
The scope and significance of these transfer treaties can best be
illustrated with an understanding of certain characteristic general
provisions. Reference in this Comment will be made to the first pris-
oner transfer treaty, which was negotiated between Mexico and the
United States. With some exceptions, to which additional reference
will be made, this treaty has served as a blueprint for those which
have followed.
B. Conditions to be Met
Under the treaty, for a petitioner to transfer, certain conditions
must exist:
(1) The prisoner must be beyond the sentencing stage.4'
(2) The prisoner must be a national of the receiving state.42
(3) The prisoner must not be a domiciliary of the transferring
state.43
(4) The crime must not have been one which was of a political
or military nature.44
(5) The prisoner must have given his consent to the transfer
both voluntarily and with full knowledge of the consequences
thereof.
(6) The offense must be one which would also be punishable in
the receiving state, but it does not have to be subject to identical
criminal sanctions.
(7) The prisoner must have at least six months of his original
sentence remaining at the time of his petition.45
(8) The time for appealing the sentence must have already
passed, and there must be no collateral attacks currently
pending.
Thus, the treaty narrowly defines the type of prisoner for whom its
provisions become effective. Persons arrested for purely military or
political offenses are excluded. 6 Therefore, neither terrorists nor an-
State, including the application of any provisions for reduction of the term of confinement by
parole, conditional release or otherwise." U.S.-Mexico Treaty, supra note 5, at art. V (2).
41. This requirement is especially significant in Turkey, where pretrial detention can
last several years. In Turkey, one tactic used by American defense attorneys is to employ a
Turkish resident familiar with the local court system to monitor the placement of the pris-
oner's trial papers within the docketing stack. Telephone interview with Robert L. Pisani, Esq.,
Exec. Dir., Int'l Legal Defense Counsel, Philadelphia, Pa. (Nov. 1, 1983).
42. Turkey's terminology is "requesting," "requested" state.
43. Mexico and Turkey define "domiciliary" as present in the foreign country for five
years with an intent to permanently remain.
44. Bolivia and Peru additionally require that the offender not have been sentenced to
the death penalty. Mexico and Canada preclude application of the transfer treaties to prisoners
convicted of violating immigration laws.
45. Turkey includes transfers for suspended sentences.
46. However, a military member convicted in a country with which the United States
Spring 1984]
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archists would qualify for the special treatment that the treaty ac-
cords. In addition, to petition for transfer the prisoner must be some-
one who has substantial ties to his homeland. Mere status as a
citizen in name or by passport alone will not suffice. The petitioner
must successfully demonstrate that he has not become a domiciliary
of the country in which the offense was committed.
C. The Role of Each State
In addition to outlining the conditions which must be met by an
offender to qualify for a transfer, the treaties delineate specific limi-
tations on the authority and appropriate functions granted to each
state involved in the transfer process:
(1) The authorities in each state "shall bear in mind all factors
bearing upon the probability that the transfer will contribute to
the social rehabilitation of the offender."
7
(2) The transferring state must have imposed final sentencing.
(3) The receiving state will enforce all such sentencing pursuant
to its own procedures or laws, including any applicable provi-
sions for parole or conditional release."8
(4) The transferring state will maintain exclusive jurisdiction
over any subsequent proceedings to review, change, or invalidate
the original sentence.49
(5) The receiving state will acknowledge and enforce whatever
modifications or reversals the transferring state may make.50
(6) The transferring state will retain the exclusive right to grant
amnesty or to pardon the prisoner."
(7) The receiving state will recognize and implement any such
changes as they occur.".
Thus, the treaties carefully demarcate the respective roles of both
the individual's own state and the state within which the offense has
occurred. Only after a sentence has been handed down by one state
does it become appropriate for the other state to become involved.
Additionally, an element of discretion has been interjected into the
determination of whether or not a transfer should take place. The
acceptance of the prisoner's petition is made dependent upon a sub-
jective determination by each state as to whether prisoner rehabilita-
tion, one of the general purposes of punishment, is likely to be fur-
thered by the transfer.
does not have a SOFA treaty (e.g., Mexico) can utilize the transfer treaty. H.R. REP. No.
720, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1977).
47. U.S.-Mexico Treaty, supra note 5, at art. IV(4).
48. Id. at art. V(2).
49. Id. at art. VI.
50. Id.
51. Id. at art. V(2).
52. Id.
[Vol. 2:2
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In examining the categories of enumerated conditions and limi-
tations, a certain pattern begins to emerge. It is clear that under the
treaties an attempt has been made to skirt the entire sphere of po-
tential conflict posed by the principle of territorial jurisdiction. The
receiving state becomes caretaker and custodian, while the transfer-
ring state serves as adjudicator and disciplinarian.
D. The Role of the Transferee
The treaties are further designed to require a written bargain
between the prisoner who wishes to transfer and the two countries
that are capable of granting his request. Under the treaties, and pur-
suant to the domestic implementing legislation, the American pris-
oner must meet with an American magistrate or other appointed offi-
cial while he is still imprisoned in the foreign country.5" In the
presence of an official recorder, he must acknowledge that he has
certain rights, and must agree to assume certain obligations arising
from the transfer process.5 '
The scope of the rights that the transferee acquires is as follows:
(1) The prisoner's country must be given a complete set of
records concerning his sentencing as well as any credits earned
for imprisonment or good behavior.55
(2) The prisoner has the right to have his country verify that his
consent was voluntary and knowing, and he has the right to
counsel at the time his consent is given. 6
(3) The prisoner's country cannot extend the length of his sen-
tence as set by the adjudicating country.57
53. The implementing legislation provides:
Prior to the transfer of an offender to the United States, the fact that the
offender consents to such transfer and that such consent is voluntary and with
full knowledge of the consequences thereof shall be verified in the country in
which the sentence was imposed by a United States magistrate.
18 U.S.C. § 4108(a) (1982).
54. The implementing legislation provides that "[T]he verifying officer shall make the
necessary inquiries to determine that ... the offender accepts the transfer subject to the con-
ditions set forth in subsection (b)." 18 U.S.C. § 1408(d) (1982). Subsection (b) provides:
[Tihe transfer will be subject to the following conditions:
(I) only the country in which he was convicted and sentenced can modify or
set aside the conviction or sentence, and any proceedings seeking such action
may only be brought in that country;
(2) the sentence shall be carried out according to the laws of the United
States and that those laws are subject to change;
(3) if a United States court should determine upon a proceeding initiated by
him or on his behalf that his transfer was not accomplished in accordance with
the treaties or laws of the United States, he may be returned to the country
which imposed the sentence for the purpose of completing the sentence if that
country requests his return; and
(4) his conseni to transfer, once verified . . . is irrevocable.
18 U.S.C. § 1408(b)(1982).
55. See U.S.-Mexico Treaty, supra note 5, at art. IV(7).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 4108(d) (1982).
57. See U.S.-Mexico Treaty, supra note 5, at art. V(3).
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(4) The fact of his transfer cannot affect the prisoner's civil
rights in his own country to any greater extent than would the
fact of his incarceration abroad. 8
(5) The prisoner's country cannot retry him upon his arrival for
the same offense as that from which his sentence and transfer
arose; there can be no double jeopardy.59
The scope of the obligations agreed to by the transferee is as
follows:
(1) The entire sentence must be enforced regardless of whether
the transfer treaty itself remains in force."
(2) Once consent has been verified it is irrevocable.6'
(3) Any proceedings to challenge, modify, or set aside the con-
viction can only be brought about in the courts of the sentencing
country."6
(4) If an American court determines that his transfer was not in
accord with either the treaty or the laws of the United States, he
can be returned to the sentencing country to complete his
sentence.63
Thus, under both the framework of the treaty and the more substan-
tial format of the American implementing legislation, the prisoner
will know that each country is made aware of and has agreed to
certain rights and limitations in relation to both the other country
and to the prisoner himself. Additionally, the prisoner is made aware
of and agrees to certain rights granted to each country, as well as
certain restrictions which apply to his post-transfer status.
E. The Efficacy of the Treaties to Date
According to the United States Department of Justice, as of
August 31, 1983, a total of 741 American citizens had been returned
to the United States under the provisions of various transfer treaties
to serve out the balance of their foreign sentences in federal pris-
ons.64 Additionally, 485 foreign citizens had been transferred from
American prisons to their home countries as of the same date. 5 As
of the end of July 1983, however, a total of sixty foreign prisoners
had been rejected for transfer to their own countries by the Depart-
58. Id. at art. V(6).
59. Id. at art. VII.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 4100(a) (1982).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 4108(b)(4) (1982).
62. See U.S.-Mexico Treaty, supra note 5, at art. VI.
63. Two different statutes provide for the receiving state to return the prisoner to the
transferring state. 18 U.S.C. § 4108(b)(3) (1982); 18 U.S.C. § 4114 (1982).
64. Statistic sheet received from Office of Int'l Affairs, Criminal Div., United States





On a practical level, much has been done to facilitate the trans-
fer process. For example, the United States Department of Justice,
Criminal Division, has published a series of informational booklets
for distribution to Americans imprisoned in countries with which the
United States has a prisoner transfer treaty.17 In addition, at least
one private American organization, the International Legal Defense
Counsel, has produced a booklet offering practical guidelines for
American citizens who find themselves subjected to foreign criminal
procedure.18 Canada, through the office of its Solicitor General, has
similarly published a handbook for its citizens imprisoned in Ameri-
can jails.6"
Both the publications of the United States Department of Jus-
tice and those of the Canadian Government contain not only the text
of the appropriate transfer treaties, but excerpts from any relevant
implementing legislation as well. These booklets, meant to be given
by the Consular Officer or some other official to the imprisoned citi-
zen, contain extensive and detailed question-and-answer sections
drafted to anticipate questions deemed most likely to be asked by an
individual incarcerated in a foreign jail.
Despite the practical success of the treaties in transferring many
prisoners, and despite the logistical support systems which have de-
veloped to augment their provisions, the treaties have not gone un-
challenged in the American judicial system. The nature of these
challenges can best be understood by considering the general legal
relationship which exists between foreign treaties and the American
Constitution.
IV. The United States Constitution and the Prisoner Transfer
Treaties
A. In General
As a basic rule in American constitutional law, provisions of a
treaty cannot stand if they are found to conflict with similar provi-
sions of the Federal Constitution.70 For example, in Reid v. Covert,
66. Id.
67. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, INFORMATION BOOKLET FOR
UNITED STATES CITIZENS INCARCERATED IN MEXICAN PRISONS REGARDING THE OPERATION
OF THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED MEXICAN STATES AND THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA ON THE EXECUTION OF PENAL SENTENCES (booklets currently available for prisoners
in Mexico, Canada, Bolivia, and Peru)(copies on file with the Dickinson Journal of Interna-
tional Law).
68. R. ATKINS & R. PISANI, THE HASSLE OF YOUR LIFE: A HANDBOOK FOR FAMILIES
OF AMERICANS JAILED ABROAD (1982).
69. SOLICITOR GENERAL, CANADA, INFORMATION BOOKLET, TREATY BETWEEN CA-
NADA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON THE TRANSFER OF OFFENDERS.
70. U.S. CONST. art. 1I, § 2; Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 46 (1920). See also E.
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the United States Supreme Court made it clear that it would not
hesitate to find certain provisions of a treaty unconstitutional and,
therefore, ineffective.71 In Reid, the agreement which the Court
found to be in conflict with the Constitution was one signed by the
United States and Great Britain in 1942. This treaty granted juris-
diction to the United States military over all crimes committed by
military dependents while residing in the foreign country.72
Under the terms of the agreement, Mrs. Covert, a civilian, was
tried and sentenced pursuant to the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice (UCMJ). In response, Covert petitioned for habeas corpus on
the grounds that the UCMJ does not grant certain of the safeguards
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. She contended that her conviction
and sentence were in violation of basic constitutional rights to which
she was entitled as an American citizen. The Supreme Court agreed
and found unconstitutional those provisions of the agreement that
limited civilian military dependents to only the rights and remedies
granted by the UCMJ. As the Court stated, "[N]o agreement with a
foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or even on any
other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the
Constitution."73
Thus, after Reid v. Covert7 4 it is clear that any treaty to which
the United States wishes to become a party will likely undergo care-
ful scrutiny by Congress to discover and correct any provisions which
look as though they might be susceptible to constitutional challenge.
In the case of the first of the prisoner transfer treaties, those with
Mexico and Canada, a strong undercurrent of concern for possible
constitutional attack surrounded both the ratification and legislative
implementation processes. 75 As a result of such concern, the imple-
menting legislation was carefully drafted under the auspices of
BYRD, TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1960).
71. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
72. Agreement Respecting Jurisdiction Over Criminal Offenses Committed by Foreign
Forces, July 27, 1942, United States-Great Britain-Northern Ireland, 57 Stat. 1193, E.A.S.
No. 355.
73. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957). Justice Black further stated:
At the time of Mrs. Covert's alleged offense, an executive agreement was in
effect . . . which permitted United States' military courts to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over offenses committed in Great Britain by American servicemen or
their dependents. For its part, the United States agreed that these military
courts would be willing and able to try and to punish all offenses against the
laws of Great Britain by such persons. . . . Even though a court martial does
not give an accused trial by jury and other Bill of Rights protections, the Gov-
ernment contends that Art. 2( 11) of the UCMJ . . . can be sustained as legisla-
tion which is necessary and proper to carry out the United States' obligations
Id. at 15-16.
74. Id.
75. Legal Issues Posing Further Delays in Mexican-U.S. Prisoners' Treaty, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 30, 1977, at 8, col. 1; N.Y. Times, July 13, 1977, at 4, col. 4.
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prominent American legal advisors such as Professors Herbert
Wechsler"6 and Detlev Vagts."7 Additionally, Congress sought to
identify possible constitutional violations inherent in the treaties by
consulting various civil rights organizations.78
B. In the Context of the Prisoner Transfer Treaty
As one American writer observed prior to ratification of the
Mexican treaty, "questions about the constitutionality of this Treaty
demand an examination of the elusive notion of due process and of
the foundation of federal jurisdiction. ' 9 In other words, the question
is whether a treaty, which vests authority in the federal government
to enforce a foreign sentence against an American citizen, is consti-
tutional when the foreign country's criminal procedures have not af-
forded "American-style" due process.
Under basic principles of international law, the country in
which a criminal offense has occurred is clearly entitled to try, con-
vict, sentence, and incarcerate most nonmilitary offenders.8" It is
equally clear under basic principles of constitutional law that the
United States is fully entitled to proscribe certain domestic activities
as criminal, and to define and enforce any appropriate punishment.8"
A more complex constitutional issue arises in the unique environ-
ment of the prisoner transfer treaties. There the United States seeks
to exercise its legitimate power to enforce sentences, but it does so in
an unusual context. It seeks to enforce upon its own citizens punish-
ments that are determined exclusively outside the American legal
system and which are imposed solely by a foreign governmental
entity.
V. Challenges to the Treaties
A. Velez v. Nelson
Shortly after the first group of Americans was returned to the
76. H.R. REP. No. 720, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1977).
77. Note, Constitutional Problems in the Execution of Foreign Penal Sentences: The
Mexican-American Prisoner Transfer Treaty, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1500 n. 116 (1977).
78. In 1977, Joel Gora, then legal director for the American Civil Liberties Union,
questioned the constitutionality of the treaties on three grounds: (1) the imprisonment of an
American whose arrest and search were unconstitutional; (2) the denial of the right to habeas
corpus, and (3) the confinement of an individual in an American prison when he had not been
charged with violating a United States law. Legal Issues Posing Further Delays in Mexico-
U.S. Prisoners' Treaty, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1977, at 8, col. 1.
79. See Note, supra note 77, at 1502.
80. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
81. Article one, section eight of the United States Constitution grants Congress the
power "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Office thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1-6005 (1982)
(Crimes and Criminal Procedure).
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United States to finish out their Mexican sentences, several of the
transferees filed petitions for habeas corpus in federal district
court.82 In Velez v. Nelson, three American citizens had been ar-
rested, imprisoned, tortured, convicted, and sentenced almost simul-
taneously on narcotics charges in Mexico.8" In each instance, the pe-
titioner had been subjected to protracted episodes of torture,
inhumane prison conditions, and extortionate fees for even the most
minimal provisions of room and board. The postarrest experiences of
these prisoners indicated a lack of any formal criminal procedure.
At each subsequent stage of the Mexican criminal judicial pro-
cess, each of the prisoners was merely led into a courtroom within
the prison where he was placed inside a chain-link pen. Each pris-
oner was then presented to a "law secretary" who informed him of
the progress of his particular case. Beginning with the introduction
of his initial narcotics charge, and continuing through to the even-
tual sentencing, none of these men were ever allowed to appear
before a judge or jury, nor were they given an opportunity to con-
front or present witnesses.8"
At the American district court level, the federal judge focused
specifically on the issue of the voluntariness of the consent given by
the prisoners at the time they submitted their petitions to transfer.8"
He cited several American criminal law cases8" for the premise that
whether or not consent is voluntary is a matter of fact "to be deter-
mined from all the surrounding circumstances. '8 Further, he said
that "[a]mong the circumstances to be considered in determining
voluntariness is length of detention, prolonged nature of questioning,
and the occurrence of physical punishment. . . . Consent which is
the result of . . . brutality or violence is constitutionally suspect."188
Applying these principles to the facts of the case, he concluded that
the consent given by the transferees was not voluntary and therefore
not valid. As a consequence, he granted the prisoners' petitions for
habeas corpus. 89
It is important to note two particular aspects of the district
court's decision. First, by choosing to focus on the issue of voluntari-
ness as a matter of fact, the court effectively avoided any need to
82. Velez v. Nelson, 475 F. Supp. 865 (D. Conn. 1979) (petitioners were transferred
under the treaty with Mexico on Dec. 10, 1977).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. It was stated, "Congress believed that consent was necessary to insulate the Treaty
from . . . constitutional attack. It, therefore, provided for the consent verification proceed-
ings." Id. at 872 n.21.
86. E.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
87. Velez v. Nelson, 475 F. Supp. at 873.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 874.
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discuss the constitutionality of the treaty per se.9° Second, the deci-
sion to grant habeas corpus, and thereby potentially to allow the
transferees to go free, points out a possible loophole in the American
implementing legislation.
Section 4108 of Title 18 of the United States Code provides
that the prisoner's petition to transfer be made both voluntarily and
with full knowledge of certain significant consequences that will re-
sult from the consent to transfer. The legislative provisions concern-
ing both knowledge and voluntariness are as follows:
(b) The verifying officer shall inquire of the offender whether he
understands and agrees that the transfer will be subject to the
following conditions:
(1) only the country in which he was convicted and sen-
tenced can modify or set aside the conviction or sentence ....
(d) The verifying officer shall make the necessary inquiries to
determine that the offender's consent is voluntary and not the
result of any promises, threats or other improper inducements
91
Thus, because the requirement of consent is written in the conjunc-
tive-"voluntary and with full knowledge of the consequences
thereof" 9 2-the legislation leaves open a potential means whereby
the transferee can subsequently effect legal escape from the enforce-
ment of his foreign sentence. Under the literal wording of the stat-
ute, he can be fully cognizant of the bargain which he appears to be
striking with both countries, and yet at the same time secretly intend
to dishonor those provisions the moment he reaches home soil.
Under Velez v. Nelson, as long as the verifying officer believes
that consent is voluntary and subsequently verifies the transfer, the
petitioner can simply come home and bring suit in federal district
court denying his voluntariness. 93 If he is successful, he will prove
that one prong, voluntariness, of the two-pronged requirement was
absent at the time of consent. Because the legislative requirement is
written in the conjunctive, once that first prong is disproved, the sec-
ond prong necessarily falls as well. Thus, the prisoner can simply
erase both the obligations he assumed on the bargain with his own
country and those which he assumed with the country in which his
offense has occurred. The only substantial risk which remains for the
prisoner following a finding that his consent was invalid is that the
90. Id. at n.25.
91. 18 U.S.C. § 4108 (1982).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 4108(a) (1982).
93. Velez v. Nelson, 475 F. Supp. at 874 n.25.
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foreign country may request his return.94
B. Rosado v. Civiletti
In Rosado v. Civiletti, the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit focused on the question of due process. There the issue was
whether the petitioners as transferees could rightfully challenge the
constitutionality of their American incarceration on the grounds that
it was prescribed by a judicial system devoid of the Bill of Rights.
Surprisingly, Judge Kaufman held that under the facts of the partic-
ular case, the transferees were entitled to bring due process claims
before American federal courts despite the fact that the process of
which they complained occurred solely within the jurisdiction of a
foreign government.95 He based this decision on a finding that no
process at all had been granted by the judicial system in Mexico:
[A]t no time did they receive even the barest rudiments of a
process calculated to arrive at the truth of the accusations
against them. They did not receive the assistance of counsel.
[ .. T]hey were not permitted to address the charges against
them. . . . Most egregious of all, the law secretary who presided
over the proceedings ...offered the influence of his position
• ..for a fee.96
Thus, based on the total absence of criminal process granted the
Americans by the Mexican legal system during the pretrial through
post-sentencing period, Judge Kaufman held that the petitioners
were entitled to bring the issue of foreign due process into the Amer-
ican courts.
As one writer has pointed out, Judge Kaufman's finding that
the transferees could bring a due process claim before a federal
court was a "startling conclusion."'9 7 Article VI of the treaty, agreed
to by the United States and ratified by the Senate, clearly specifies
94. See supra note 54. See also 18 U.S.C. § 4114(a) (1982) which provides:
Upon a final decision by the courts of the United States that the transfer of
the offender to the United States was not in accordance with the treaty or the
laws of the United States and ordering the offender released from serving the
sentence in the United States the offender may be returned to the country from
which he was transferred to complete the sentence if the country in which the
sentence was imposed requests his return. The Attorney General shall notify the
appropriate authority of the country which imposed the sentence, within ten
days, of a final decision of a court of the United States ordering the offender
released.
95. Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856
(1980), reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1027 (1980).
96. Id. at 1197.
97. Note, American Nationals Transferred from Mexican Prisons to Serve the Re-
mainder of Their Sentences in Federal Penal Institutions May Raise Due Process Claims in
Federal Courts, but They are Estopped from Challenging Their Sentences in American
Courts if They Consented to Abide by the Terms of the Treaty on the Execution of Penal
Sentences, 15 TEX. INT'L L.J. 565, 568 (1980).
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that the "[t]ransferring State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over
any proceedings, regardless of their form, intended to challenge,
modify, or set aside sentences handed down by its courts." 98
Consequently, to have held for any reason at all that a trans-
feree could have access to the court of the receiving state to question
the process or any other aspect of the transferring state's judicial
functions in relation to the transferee is to have directly violated one
of the provisions reciprocally agreed upon by both the United States
and Mexico. The above mentioned "startling conclusion" however
has had little practical effect on the endurance and stability of the
prisoner transfer treaties.
In resolving the second main issue in Rosado v. Civiletti, Judge
Kaufman held that the question of voluntariness should not be al-
lowed to undermine the general intent and overall purpose behind
the treaty. In this portion of his opinion he approached the issues
presented by the petitioners from more of an international perspec-
tive than had the district court judge. In examining the general cli-
mate from which the basic concept for the treaty had grown, he
noted the degree of care and concern that had been employed by
Congress to enact implementing legislation designed to withstand all
possible challenges. In sharp contrast to the way in which he had
dealt with the issue of due process, Judge Kaufman viewed the issue
of voluntariness not from the perspective of the specific facts and
circumstances peculiar to the individual petitioners, but rather from
the point of view of two important policy considerations.
First, he noted "the Government's substantial interest in pro-
moting good relations with Mexico by honoring its criminal convic-
tions and recognizing the integrity of its criminal justice system.""
Second, and even more importantly, he cited the practical effect
likely to result from allowing a transferee to escape through a legis-
lative loophole as was done in Velez v. Nelson. As the Second Cir-
cuit saw it, if voluntariness were allowed to be litigated following
transfer on the grounds of the "conduct of Mexicans on Mexican
soil" no magistrate would ever again be willing to certify that any
consent in Mexico had been voluntarily given.100 In other words, to
endorse the Velez decision would be to effectively close the door to
transfer for countless other Americans hoping to escape the torture
and substandard conditions of a foreign prison system.
Thus, Rosado granted prisoner transfer treaties the judicial en-
dorsement for which Congress had long been hoping. Despite his
rather surprising deviation from the explicit provisions of the treaty
98. U.S.-Mexico Treaty, supra note 5, at art. VI.
99. Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d at 1190.
100. Id.
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concerning the petitioner's right to challenge foreign sentences in do-
mestic courts, Judge Kaufman's holding on the question of voluntari-
ness clearly removed any potential loophole created by the legislative
conjunctive requirement of "voluntary and with full knowledge."
VI. Conclusion
Each year the State Department in its Report to Congress of
Americans Incarcerated Abroad compiles statistics concerning the
number of United States citizens officially imprisoned in foreign
jails.1"' According to the report for 1982, a total of 1729 Americans
were confined in foreign prisons. Additional State Department statis-
tics indicate that from 1977 through 1982, an average of approxi-
mately 3158 American citizens were arrested in foreign countries.102
Drug related arrests were on the increase by thirty-five percent in
1982, and Mexico and Canada were two of the countries in which
the greatest number of total arrests occurred.' 3
In light of such statistics, the role of the prisoner transfer treaty
is clearly an important one. Without violating any of the traditional
rights of a sovereign nation to exert its own territorial jurisdiction, it
creates one certain and well regulated means by which American
citizens can escape the dangers and trauma of a foreign prison. For
this reason it is especially important that in Rosado v. Civiletti
Judge Kaufman chose as he did to "hold open the door for others
similarly victimized to escape their torment."104
Patricia M. Wilson
101. The following figures reflect the total number of nonmilitary American citizens ar-







1983 (Nov. 1) 2572
Telephone interview with Roy Davis, U.S. Dep't of State (Nov. 1, 1983).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d at 1201.
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